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Abstract
To combat climate change, cap-and-trade policies have been proposed and implemented in countries
around the world. The stochastic carbon price that results from a cap-and-trade policy makes investment
decisions in carbon mitigating and sequestering practices more complex. This letter illustrates the
consequence of uncertainty by analyzing forest carbon offset credits under a potential cap-and-trade
policy in the United States. The effects of uncertainty on afforestation, carbon sequestration, cropland
allocation, and commodity prices using a real option framework are assessed. When compared with
deterministic models, less land gets converted from cropland to forestry over the projection period of 40
years because landowners find it optimal to wait before changing land-use to gain more information
about the carbon price evolution. The simulation shows that most afforestation occurs in the south and
the northeast with almost no conversion in the Corn Belt. The lesson for policy makers is that under
carbon price uncertainty, lower afforestation and carbon sequestration takes place. To foster afforestation,
mechanisms are necessary to reduce uncertainty at the expense of higher commodity prices.
Keywords: land-use change, real options, greenhouse gas emissions, commodity prices,
carbon sequestration
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1. Introduction
Raising concern about climate change has lead to the
development of cap-and-trade policies around the world.
Examples of emission trading systems covering greenhouse
gases and air pollutants are found in Australia, the European
Union, New Zealand, and the United States. Under a
cap-and-trade system, the regulator sets a maximum quantity
of emissions and distributes emission allowances equal to the
cap. Entities subject to the regulation need allowances for
each unit of emission but can trade the allowances among
Content from this work may be used under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 licence. Any further
distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the
title of the work, journal citation and DOI.
each other. Economic theory requires the allowance price1
emerging from trading to be equal to the marginal abatement
cost across all firms. Uncertainty in firms’ abatement costs
leads to a stochastic allowance price which makes the
investment decisions in pollution abating and sequestering
activities more complex. The present work illustrates the
consequences associated with a stochastic allowance price by
analyzing the afforestation decision of landowners to provide
forest carbon offset credits under a potential cap-and-trade
policy in the United States.
The American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act of
2009 and the American Power Act (APA) of 2010 have been
presented in the US and either act would have established a
1 In this letter, the words ‘carbon price’ and ‘allowance price’ are used
interchangeably. The carbon price is measured in CO2-equivalent.
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cap-and-trade system. Both proposals included the possibility
for the agricultural sector to provide offset credits from carbon
sequestration through afforestation. Carbon sequestration in
forests is viewed as a low-cost way to mitigate climate
change [1–3]. In June 2013, President Obama presented
a climate action plan which includes the statement that
‘America’s forests play a critical role in addressing carbon
pollution, removing nearly 12% of total US greenhouse gas
emissions each year’ and that the administration ‘is working to
identify new approaches to protect and restore our forests’ [4].
Given the role attributed to forests in climate change policy
and in view of potential future policy discussion, it is of
interest to verify and quantify the potential of forest carbon
sequestration in the presence of uncertainty.
The evolution of forest and cropland in the US has
either been analyzed in a deterministic setting [5, 6] or in
the absence of agricultural returns [7]. Previous literature
calculated carbon sequestration supply functions and found
that a time constant $100 per-acre subsidy for afforestation
would double the forest area from 405 to 754 million acres
over a 250 year simulation period [3, 5]. Other research
has shown that given a deterministically increasing carbon
price, it is optimal to delay afforestation projects because
of non-linear carbon sequestration paths in wood [8]. This
present research extends the aforementioned literature by
assessing the role of uncertainty in a US afforestation model
because a cap-and-trade system as the market-based policy
for climate change policies will likely be the mechanism of
choice.
Adding to the uncertainty from a stochastic carbon price
is the inherent price, yield, and cost uncertainty associated
with crop production or forestry. In addition, changing
land-use from cropland to forest incurs switching costs related
to soil preparation and planting. Once in forestry, it is
costly to revert back to cropland because of the expenses
associated with forest clearing. Given those factors, it might
be optimal for a landowner to delay afforestation in order
to gain more information about future prices and revenues
and thus, the landowner holds a valuable option to wait [9].
Previous research has shown that the net present value (NPV)
method is inadequate in the presence of uncertainty and costly
reversibility and that the investment possibility should be
treated as an option which can be exercised at some unknown
time in the future [10]. To distinguish the option to invest from
a financial option that can be traded, the term ‘real option’ is
used. The real option framework requires a higher expected
return from forestry before a change in land-use occurs than
the NPV method due to a different switching decision as
compared to a deterministic model [11].
The real option framework was previously used to
examine the decision to switch land-use under return
uncertainty and switching cost but without endogenous
agricultural returns [12, 13]. The present analysis is similar
to optimal regime switching models for industry entry and
exit decisions where a landowner can ‘exit’ from agriculture
and ‘enter’ forestry [11, 14, 15]. In this case, the ‘exit’ option
does not lead to a return of zero as in the aforementioned
literature but is characterized by the returns from forestry
which includes carbon sequestration credits. Large-scale
afforestation due to a major policy change has not occurred
in the US over the last few decades making conclusions from
econometric estimates difficult. To overcome this issue, a real
option simulation model is applied to perfectly competitive
markets as in previous literature [16–20]. Under perfect
competition, the landowner realizes that the market will
provide an equilibrium such that all market participants are
indifferent between switching or staying in the current use. On
one hand, a landowner has the incentive to stay in agriculture
expecting agricultural prices to rise in the future due to other
landowners switching to forestry. On the other hand, all other
landowners have the same incentive and hence, commodity
prices would be unchanged. This letter is the first to use a
real option model with endogenous agricultural returns that
simulates switching from cropland to forestry in a stochastic
environment with costly reversibility.
The present results are fourfold: first, our model yields
less afforestation than under deterministic models because
landowners find it optimal to delay afforestation. This also
leads to less carbon sequestered over the projection period
of 40 years. Second, afforestation starts occurring early in
areas characterized by low agricultural productivity, i.e., the
southeast and the northeast. Third, the loss of cropland
in those areas is compensated in part by an increase in
production elsewhere, mostly in the western part of the
country. Almost no land conversion takes place in the Corn
Belt. And lastly, the increase in crop prices begins after
20 years and increases until the end of the projection period.
This also suggests that commodity prices will be driven
by carbon prices in the longterm. The lower and delayed
afforestation results in smaller commodity price increases
than previously estimated [21].
The lessons for policy makers is that investment in
afforestation is hindered under a stochastic carbon price
and that different incentive mechanisms are necessary to
decrease fluctuations in carbon payments for landowners.
Additionally, these results show that higher commodity prices
as an argument against agricultural offset credits has less
validity. Lastly, there is a tradeoff between amount of new
forest and commodity prices.
2. Methods
The detailed mathematical modeling can be found in the
supplementary material (available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/8/
044020/mmedia) and we limit our exposition in this section
to the general framework. The model covers counties in
the contiguous United States and four commodities: corn,
hay, soybeans, and wheat. We focus on those commodities
because they represented 87% of crop area in the United
States in 2010 and are major food and feed commodities.
At time t, there is a representative landowner in each county
i who can be in either of two regimes: agriculture (A) or
forestry (F). Each regime k ∈ A,F is affected by a random
disturbance k which follows a stochastic process. Let qt be
the total amount of land available for agriculture in the United
States at time t. Let Bi,A(qt, A(t)) and Bi,F(F(t)) be the
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per-acre net return from agriculture and forestry in county
i, respectively. We assume that Bi,A(qt, A(t)) = Ri(qt) ×
A(t) where Ri(qt) is a deterministic function calculating the
per-acre net return based on qt and calibrated to include
yield, cost, land availability, etc for county i and all other
counties. Given qt, a competitive, price-taking equilibrium
in terms of prices, demand, and cropland allocation can be
derived. The calibration of Ri(qt) is described in detail in
the supplementary information and has been used in previous
literature [22]. Note that ∂Ri/∂qt < 0, i.e., a reduction in
available land for crop production increase net returns. For
A(t), we assume a mean reverting process consistent with the
perfectly competitive nature of agriculture [19]. This implies
that if qt remains unchanged over time, the per-acre net return
fluctuates around an ‘average value’ in county i due to price,
yield, and cost fluctuations. The stochastic return function for
forestry Bi,F(F(t)) is determined by the carbon price F(t)
and calibrated for each county based on carbon sequestration
rate, tree type, and stumpage prices. The stochastic process for
the carbon price is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion
(GBM) which results in an exponentially increasing carbon
price over time. This is consistent with a tightening cap under
a cap-and-trade system. At each time step, new realizations
of the disturbance terms are drawn based on the stochastic
processes. Based on the draw and the total land available qt,
the landowner can calculate the net return on both regimes
and can then decided whether to switch to forestry or stay in
agriculture.
The decision based on the real option model for a
generic landowner at some time t is illustrated in figure 1.
The expected growth rate of forestry returns is set to 5%
with a volatility parameter of σ = 0.04. Switching costs are
assumed to $659. Assume that for the current qt, net returns
from agriculture are fluctuating around a mean of $150 in
the long-run and that returns from forestry are increasing
at an expected annual rate of 5%. Without uncertainty, the
net present value rule would trigger a switch to forestry at
approximately $75. Under uncertainty, the landowner finds
it optimal to wait in order to gather more information which
leads to a higher investment threshold of $225 instead of $75.
The three scenarios analyzed differ in terms of allowance
price growth rates and starting price. The USDA/EPA bases
its analysis on a carbon price starting at $10 per ton in 2010
increasing at 5% per year [21]. The scenarios ‘price floor’
and ‘price ceiling’ serve to determine the lower and upper
bound of our estimates in terms of area allocation, carbon
sequestration, and prices because the ACES Act and APA
include a price collar to limit compliance costs. For the APA,
the inflation-adjusted price floor starts at $12 per t CO2 and
increases at 3% per year and the price ceiling starts at $25
per t CO2 and increases at 5% per year. Figure 3 shows 100
possible allowance price paths for the three scenarios.
The landowner gets paid yearly for the forest carbon
sequestered. The model allows the landowner to switch to
forestry only once and hence, no breach of contract is possible
over the time frame. The model does not allow for the forest
to be cut down for selling the timber. However, the stumpage
value is included, i.e., the value of the standing forest, in our
analysis.
Figure 1. Illustration of the real option framework on the
investment threshold. The long-run equilibrium for agricultural
returns is set to $150 with a standard deviation of σ = 25. In the
real option framework, the landowner switches to forestry if the net
return from forestry is above the ‘real option’ line for a given net
return from agriculture.
The model is at the county level and homogeneous
land-quality is assumed for the entire county, i.e., there are
no within county differences in terms of crop yield, carbon
sequestration, or cost. This assumption is justified because
most of the analysis and results are driven by counties in the
eastern part of the United States where counties are relatively
small compared to counties in the western part of the country.
Afforestation is restricted to areas with more than 700 mm
of average annual precipitation and which had previous forest
coverage (figure 2). Table 1 summarizes the assumptions for
the forestry component in our model based on the regions
in figure 2. Legislation would distribute carbon credits based
on additional forest and not on existing forest and hence, we
include only counties that had crops harvested in at least five
years between 2000 and 2010. A limitation of the model is that
neither the demand functions nor the yield include a time trend
as a state variable because it would increase computational
time exponentially. Implicit in this assumption is that any
yield increase is offset by an increase in demand leaving the
crop area unchanged in the long-run. Over the last few years,
there has been a slight downward trend in wheat area and
an upward trend in corn and soybean area but total cropland
for the four crops has been fluctuating between 243 and 270
million acres over the last 20 years. The yield and production
levels are calibrated to 2022 as the base year (t = 0) which
represents the current long-run equilibrium projected by the
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute [23]. The dis-
count rate for the model is set to 8%. The numerical analysis
for this model is computationally intensive thus we limit our
Monte Carlo simulation to 500 runs a period of 40 years.
3. Results
A summary of the key assumptions, parameters, and results
for forest area and CO2 sequestration for all three scenarios
3
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Precipitation over 700 mm
Historic Forest
Forest Region
Figure 2. Geographic coverage with historic forest coverage and precipitation over 700 mm: the average annual precipitation between 1960
and 2008 for the United States was obtained from the PRISM Climate Group at Oregon State University. Historic forest cover was obtained
from ‘Global Forest Watch’ and the forest regions correspond to Smith et al [32]. The eight regions modeled are the northeast (NE), the
northern lake states (NLS), the northern plain states (NPS), the Pacific south west (PSW), the Pacific northwest (PWE), Rocky mountains
north (RMN), southeast (SE), and south central (SC).
Figure 3. Allowance price simulations (n = 100). To reflect the recent uncertainty in the EU emission allowance price, we set σF to 0.04.
Table 1. Forest rent and sequestration. Notes. ‘$/t’ is the stumpage price per ton, i.e., the value of the standing forest. ‘Rent’ and ‘NPV’ are
annualized rent and the net present value, respectively. The annual sequestration rate is found in the column ‘CO2-e yr−1’. ‘Cost’ is the
per-acre switching cost.
Region Forest type $/t Rent NPV CO2-e yr−1 Cost
NE Oak–hickory 45 53.87 673.42 3.39 937
NLS Oak–hickory 25 34.41 430.17 2.13 638
NPS Elm–ash–cottonwood 15 21.72 271.56 2.06 614
PSW Fir–spruce–mountain hemlock 15 22.19 277.39 1.85 850
PWE Douglas–fir 15 18.89 236.13 4.47 850
RMN Douglas–fir 35 47.04 588.01 2.52 652
SC Loblolly–shortleaf pine 30 34.27 428.32 3.25 325
SE Loblolly–shortleaf pine 30 34.27 428.32 3.19 260
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Figure 4. Histogram of forest area in million acres at t = 40 after 500 simulations.
Table 2. Key scenario parameters and results. The volatility parameters σA and σF are set to 0.25 and 0.04, respectively. The mean
reversion of agriculture is set to η = 0.6.
USDA/EPA Price ceiling Price floor
Initial CO2 price $10 $25 $12
CO2 price growth rate (%) 5 5 3
Expected CO2 price in t = 40 $73.89 $184.73 $39.84
Mean forest area in million acres (t = 40) 34.39 67.00 18.52
CO2 sequestration (t = 40) 111.07 208.16 60.22
is provided in table 2. A key premise of this model is that
agricultural markets in the US are in the long-run equilibrium
at the beginning of the simulation period which is 2022.
Hence, any reference to the baseline refers to the prices and
quantities in the base year. In the description of the results, the
focus is mostly on the scenario ‘USDA/EPA’ which represents
the middle path between the price floor and the price ceiling
and it makes our analysis comparable to the USDA/EPA
carbon price path [21]. The figures only show counties in the
eastern part of the US which represent the majority of corn,
hay, soybean, and wheat area as well as afforestation activity.
3.1. Forestry and carbon sequestration impact
The uncertainty in returns translates directly in the forest area
planted which ranges from 11.35 to 77.29 million acres in
the ‘USDA/EPA’ scenario (figure 4). In the ‘price ceiling’
scenario, forest area increases considerably in the first years,
i.e., 21.3% of the total acreage afforested occurs in the first
5 years. We will see later that this does not manifest itself
in the commodity prices, which leads to the conclusion that
the counties switching initially represent ‘low hanging fruits’
because of low crop yields and low acreage.
Previous analysis showed a significant impact of forestry
offsets on carbon sequestration with over 1835 Mt of
CO2-equivalent sequestered at a deterministic price of roughly
$80 [5]. This is substantially higher than our estimate of
111.07 Mt of CO2-equivalent at a price of $74 (figure 5).
The spread associated with carbon sequestration over the
projection period of 40 years is represented in figure 5.
Planting of new forest will likely take place in the western
parts of Kentucky and Ohio, eastern parts of the Carolinas,
at the border of Texas and Oklahoma, and to some extent in
the southeast. The switching in the aforementioned areas is
due to the relatively low net return from agriculture compared
to the non-carbon rents and the carbon sequestration rates.
Note that even in the high allowance price scenario, almost
no conversion occurs in the Corn Belt (figure 6).
The carbon sequestration in the scenario of interest
(‘USDA/EPA’) is 111.07 Mt of CO2-equivalent. The supply
is lower than previously estimated [24, 5] due to uncertainty
associated with the allowance price and the increase of
commodity prices and thus, net return. From an environmental
policy perspective, the shortage of afforestation misses the
goal of increasing carbon sequestration because of a policy
instrument that leads to investment uncertainty.
3.2. Crop area impact
Crop production in the US responds spatially and three
distinctive patterns can be identified (figure 7). In the eastern
United States, counties reduce their crop area because a
5
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Figure 5. Carbon sequestration in CO2-equivalent over 500 simulation runs. The central mark for each box represents the median value of
the 500 runs. The size of the box is the interquartile range (IQR), i.e., between the 25th and 75th percentile, and the whiskers extends either
1.5 times the IQR or extends to the minimum (maximum) observation if that observation is within 1.5 times the IQR. The hash marks are
considered outliers or extreme values.
switch to forestry occurs. Eastern and Mid-Atlantic states
stretching from New York to Georgia are predicted to have
significant declines in crop acreage. This is consistent with
low agricultural net return in most counties in the southeast
and northeast. Second, in the western United States where
afforestation is potential limited, crop area expands for
certain crops because landowners see higher prices because
of cropland contraction in the eastern United States. If
cropland is reduced in one part of the country, prices increase,
serving as a signal to landowners/farmers in other parts of
the country to increase their production. Finally, there is
an increase in corn and soybean area in the Corn Belt as
a result of high crop prices and high net returns making
afforestation in those areas unattractive. The same can be
observed in the case of the ‘price floor’ and ‘price ceiling’
scenarios. In general, afforestation activity in the US would
shift agricultural production more towards the western United
States.
3.3. Commodity price impacts
Apart from the ‘price ceiling’ scenario, commodity prices do
not start to increase immediately but rather after 20 years
(figure 8). At the beginning, the allowance price is too
low to make a switching to forest profitable. The option to
delay afforestation and wait for more information about the
carbon price and the net return leads to a waiting period
at the beginning of the simulation where no afforestation
takes place. The allowance price and the revenue earned
from carbon sequestration are relatively low compared to
the net return from agriculture during this period. From a
political and economic perspective, the finding of overall
lower price impacts on crops is important in evaluating the
impacts of a cap-and-trade policy on agriculture. This research
suggests that there will be only a negligible commodity price
increase in the short- to medium-run, i.e., 15–20 years, from a
cap-and-trade policy.
The scenario ‘price ceiling’ simulates a very high carbon
price with a mean of close to $185 after 40 years and the
resulting price impacts after 40 years are important, especially
for hay, soybeans, and wheat when compared with previous
scenarios. The price impact for all commodities is moderate
in the low price scenarios because the net returns for corn
and soybeans are relatively high and almost no conversion
takes place at a low carbon price. However, an increase of
the carbon price to levels seen in the ‘price ceiling’ scenario
makes conversion profitable in places that did not switch in
the previous scenarios.
3.4. Sensitivity analysis
We need to impose restrictive assumptions on the model
and the model parameters because at the core of the
model are multiple partial differential equations that are
solved numerically. Besides being time intensive to solve,
adding more state variables to the model increases the risk
of non-convergence to a numerical solution. This section
provides a qualitative assessment of the results’ sensitivity
with respect to some of those assumptions especially the
endogeneity of the forest returns, the correlation of the
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Figure 6. Average annual per county carbon sequestration in 1000 metric tons of CO2-equivalent after 40 years simulated 500 times.
(a) EPA/USDA. (b) Price ceiling. (c) Price floor.
stochastic processes, the irreversibility, the evolution of the
allowance price, and changes in crop management.
This letter models agriculture endogenously while the
forest sector, as well as the allowance price, are exogenous.
In reality, if forest area increases, forestry returns will decline
because more forest products such as timber will become
available in the long-run and decrease the price. In addition,
increasing the supply of carbon offset credits would lower
the allowance price. Addressing both issues in our model
would require an additional set of assumptions and would
increase computational time exponentially. The allowance
price is not endogenously modeled but in general one would
expect a low impact on the allowance price given low
afforestation activity even in the absence of endogeneity.
Related to the evolution of the stochastic processes is the
possible correlation between allowance price and commodity
returns. Although we assume zero correlation, the past years
have shown that energy and agricultural markets are linked
through the presence of biofuels. Higher energy prices would
affect agriculture leading to higher returns [25] but would also
affect the allowance price. Given higher energy prices, firms
would reduce energy intensive inputs and would thus most
likely require less emission allowances leading to a lower
allowance price. A positive correlation would provide an even
lower incentive to switch to forestry.
The landowner in this model can change land-use,
i.e., switch to forestry, only once. Allowing a two-way
conversion, i.e., the possibility to switch back to agriculture,
would lead to more forestry because ‘a real option model
that allows only one-way conversion will predict significantly
greater farmer reluctance to convert than a two-way
model’ [9] (p 777).
The emission allowances price increases at a constant
rate in this letter as well as in previous analysis [21]. It
is questionable that this is true in the time horizon usually
considered. Mitigation technologies develop and firms would
adopt different input mixes for production. Over time, it is
therefore more likely to see a mean reverting carbon price.
This would be a disincentive for landowners to invest in
forestry. An additional disincentive for landowners to switch
is the change of crop management practices (e.g., more
efficient fertilizer application) to earn offset credits. Those
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Figure 7. Average percentage change of crop area between t = 0 and 40 for the ‘USDA/EPA’ scenario. (a) Corn. (b) Hay. (c) Soybeans.
(d) Wheat.
changes in production practices are not considered in our
model but would generate additional revenue while in crop
production.
The reluctance of farmers to switch from agriculture to
afforestation is due to the presence of uncertainty in our
model. A reduction (increase) in either forestry or agriculture
makes a switch to that activity more attractive (less attractive).
For example, a reduction of the allowance price fluctuations
due to the introduction of hedging instruments would make
the switch to forestry more likely. The analysis is complicated
by the fact that the actual legislation imposes binding price
floors and ceilings which makes the problem slightly different
than in our analysis
4. Discussion
The results of the previous section warrant some discussion
on the effects of environmental or climate change policy
with stochastic returns on investments such as afforestation.
Reducing the uncertainty associated with forest carbon
sequestration or any other sequestration or mitigation project
will be key to triggering investment as part of a climate policy.
A cap-and-trade system is a so-called ‘quantity instrument’
because the emission quantity is known a priori but the
resulting allowance price remains unknown when the policy is
put in place. An alternative climate instrument is an emission
tax where the regulator collects a set tax rate on each unit
emitted. It can be shown that each firm abates until their
marginal abatement cost is equal to the tax rate. An emission
tax is considered a price instrument because the price per
unit of emission is per-determined but the quantity abated
is unknown. From an economic perspective, both policies,
cap-and-trade and an emission tax, are equivalent in the sense
that they are achieving the same least cost solution of emission
abatement. From a political perspective, those instruments are
not equivalent because under the emission tax, revenue is
transferred from the firms to the government. The advantage
of an emission tax is that the price per ton of CO2-equivalent
is determined and could serve as a non-stochastic payment
for forest offset credits and thus, trigger more afforestation.
Alternatively, under a cap-and-trade system, we would expect
a futures market to be formed for the carbon price. This would
8
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Figure 8. Price evolution for the four commodities over the projection period of 40 years.
lock-in future carbon prices for landowners reducing the risk
of carbon price fluctuations. The presence of agricultural
subsidies has the potential to increase the returns from
agriculture making the switch to forestry less attractive. In
addition, crop insurance bounds the potential losses implicitly
limiting the downside risk of agriculture.
Besides uncertainty, other issues include the role of
pasture, farmers’ welfare, and ‘land sparing’. Pasture serves as
additional area for cropland expansion as the loss of cropland
to afforestation in one county can be offset by expansion of
cropland into pasture in another county. According to the US
Department of Agriculture, there are between 384 and 409
million acres of pasture in the United States depending on the
definition. Pasture could be reduced significantly because of
(a) afforestation and (b) cropland expansion because of higher
commodity prices. We hypothesize that including pasture in
our model would add significant amounts of forest to the
landscape. It is not clear what the afforestation of pasture
would do to livestock herds that depend on grazing areas
but this is an obvious subject for future research. In states
where no afforestation is possible, cropland is expanded at
the expense of pasture. Pasture can serve as a reserve pool
for cropland expansion and thus, pasture can be used to offset
the crop production which is lost in parts of the country due
to afforestation.
An important consideration for including forest offset
credits in the legislation is to improve the welfare of
landowners and farmers. Improving welfare includes at leas
three key issues. First, counties with a high probability
of switching gain more from the afforestation program
than counties staying in agriculture although net return
increases for both. Counties switching to forestry do so
because of higher returns associated with forestry than with
agriculture. Low agricultural productivity does not translate
into low carbon sequestration rates for trees. For example,
the northeast has a low agricultural productivity but the
carbon sequestration rate of 3.39 t CO2-e per acre for
oak–hickories are only exceeded by tree species in the
Pacific northwest and the Pacific southwest. Second, welfare
increases for all landowners because commodity prices
increase for landowners staying in agriculture and landowners
switching to forestry face a higher return than from staying
in agriculture. Third, because of lower afforestation than
previously estimated, the price increases are less and thus the
welfare increase is less than previously estimated. Related to
the issue of farmers’ welfare are the political consequences
of a possible shift in cropland in the United States. Although
difficult to evaluate, the example of the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) can be used and its political implications
as described in [26, 27]. The mechanisms to allocate CRP
funds and the determination of the Environmental Benefit
9
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Index, which in turn influences the fund allocation, reflects
the preferences of different interest groups, e.g., politicians,
farmers, and so on. The shift of agricultural production would
happen to a lower extent even in the absence of uncertainty.
A second issue which is not addressed in the letter is
the possibility of a ‘natural attrition’ of cropland. If yield
increases at a faster pace than the crop demand, more cropland
becomes available for forest because the increase in supply
leads to lower commodity prices. Landowners would then
have the incentive to switch away from agriculture leading
to potential afforestation and stable commodity prices. The
concept of ‘land sparing’ has been analyzed previously
and leads to two opposing effects. In one case, less land
is necessary for the same amount of production if yields
increase [28]. Alternatively, higher yields make it more
attractive to increase the amount of land in production [29].
The latter effect can be limited because commodity demand
is limited and hence, the amount of land that can be
put in production is limited as well. Data from USDA’s
National Agricultural Statistics Service shows that the number
of counties engaged in agricultural production has been
declining over the last 30 years. The yield increase in the
long-run can also be accelerated by the increase in commodity
prices. Previous literature rejects the null hypothesis of price
having no effect on yields in the long-run [30] and the effects
in terms of land-use change can be substantial [31]. Because
commodity prices do increase in our scenarios, the possibility
of higher yields is given.
5. Conclusion
A cap-and-trade mechanism is the preferred policy to combat
climate change in the United States and elsewhere. The
resulting uncertainty in the carbon price and its effects on
investment in carbon sequestering and mitigating options are
illustrated in this letter using the example of forest carbon
offset credits. Previous research has analyzed afforestation
and forest carbon sequestration in deterministic settings and
found significant increases in forest area in the United States.
In addition to uncertainty, planting a forest is costly to reverse
and the landowner looses the flexibility to adapt land to market
conditions. Hence, the landowner holds a valuable option to
wait before making the decision to switch.
The consequence of holding the option to wait is delayed
afforestation and lower carbon sequestration. These three
scenarios differ in terms of the initial carbon price and the
carbon price growth rate. Two of the scenarios are setting
the lower and upper boundaries in terms of afforestation,
carbon sequestration, and commodity prices. In all scenarios,
almost no afforestation takes place in the Corn Belt. This
also explains the finding of less than a 40% increase of
corn, soybeans, and wheat prices in the two scenarios. The
incentive to wait for further information about the evolution
of net returns in agriculture and forestry leads to a delay
of over 20 years before an increase in commodity prices is
observed in all scenarios expect ‘price ceiling’. Afforestation
takes place in the southeast due to lower agricultural revenues
and hence lower opportunity costs when planting a forest.
With the expansion in forestry in the eastern part of the
country, crop production increases in the western part of
the country where afforestation is not possible because of
biological constraints.
From a policy perspective, the appropriateness of a
market-based mechanism such as cap-and-trade for climate
policy must be carefully evaluated. The decision to wait
before investing is not limited to forest offset credits but
expands to all investments whose return is stochastic. For the
case of afforestation, the impact on commodity prices and
shift of agricultural production in the US should be evaluated
by policy makers. Due to delayed and lower afforestation
rates, offset revenue and hence, improved conditions for the
farm sector will likely be low. The letter shows that in the
presence of carbon payments, a clear relationship between
carbon/energy, forest, and agricultural markets exists.
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